It is often the case that individuals in a social group can perform certain tasks (such as hunting, for example) more e¤ciently if they collaborate with other individuals than if they act alone. In such situations one is necessarily faced with the problem of how the resource obtained as the result of such a collaboration should be divided among the collaborating individuals. If one of the individuals in the collaboration is in a position (through its dominance rank, for example) to impose a particular division of the resource on the other members of the collaboration then we show that an evolutionary dilemma arises which prevents such collaborations being evolutionarily stable. This dilemma, which is closely related to the well-known Ultimatum Game, results from the fact that in such situations natural selection favours individuals who, if dominant, o¡er smaller and smaller shares of the resource to the others and, if subdominant, will accept lower and lower o¡ers. We also show, however, that this dilemma is naturally resolved in a spatially structured population with selection favouring the evolution of a fair division of the resource and consequently ensuring the evolutionary stability of collaborations of this type.
INTRODUCTION
Many activities that are engaged in by animals are more e¡ective if undertaken by more than one animal rather than by a single individual. Examples of such activities include hunting, defending territory and guarding a group of females (Wilson 1975; Krebs & Davies 1993 , 1997 . In the simplest case two individuals collaborate (in hunting, for example) to try to obtain an objective, which if achieved results, on average, in the pair gaining a resource (food, for example) which is more than twice as great as that which would be obtained by each animal acting alone. Thus the pair obtains, as a result of a successful collaboration, an excess resource of size R. The following question then naturally arises: how should the resource be divided between the two collaborators? Clearly no collaboration will be evolutionarily stable if either one of the participants is no better o¡ than if it had acted alone. Thus each animal must receive at least as much of the resource as it could have obtained by acting independently. The essential question therefore reduces to: how should the excess resource R be split between the pair ? Splitting the excess equally so that each individual receives one-half of R would accord with our idea of a fair division, but is there any reason why we should expect such a fair division to evolve by natural selection?
In practice there will often be an asymmetry between the two prospective collaborators, such as size, strength or ¢ghting ability, or more generally, position in a dominance hierarchy (Wilson 1975; Krebs & Davies 1993 , 1997 , which results in one of the individuals being able to impose a particular division of the excess resource resulting from a successful collaboration on the other individual. We therefore consider here the following situation: a potential collaboration consists of two individuals, one of whom is in a position to determine how the excess resource resulting from a successful collaboration will be divided, while the other individual is only in a position to accept or reject the proposed collaboration. Here we shall assume that the division that an individual will impose if dominant and the minimum o¡er an individual is prepared to accept if subdominant are genetically determined characteristics of that individual, and, in addition, that every individual is aware of the value of the division it would receive from any animal that is dominant over it, either through past interactions with the individual or through observing this animal interacting with others. Given these assumptions, the question that we consider here is: what division of the excess resource will evolve under the in£uence of natural selection?
In order to study this question we give a precise formulation of the division problem in terms of an evolutionary game and then show that the evolutionary outcome predicted by game theory is somewhat paradoxical. The evolutionary outcome of the division problem is that the dominant individual o¡ers a zero share of the excess resource to the other animal, and the subdominant individual is prepared to accept any share that it is o¡ered. Thus the subdominant animal is no better o¡ than if it had acted alone and no such collaboration could be evolutionarily stable. Consequently, since such collaborations will not take place and therefore the excess resource R will not be available to either animal, the dominant individual will be worse o¡ than it would have been had it been genetically programmed to o¡er a more generous share to any prospective partner and therefore allowed successful collaborations to take place. Thus individual selection results in a paradoxical situation, in some ways reminiscent of the Prisoner's Dilemma (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 1984) , in which both individuals are worse o¡ than they would have been had the dominant individual been programmed to o¡er a fairer division of R. This outcome is closely related to the behaviour of the celebrated Ultimatum Game (Gu« th et al. 1982; Thaler 1988) , which has recently been considered from the point of view of evolutionary game theory Page et al. 2000) .
In this paper we consider how this Collaborator's Dilemma can be resolved. We show here that if this problem is considered in a spatially structured context then much fairer divisions automatically evolve. Hence spatial structure resolves the di¤culties associated with the division problem and provides a natural explanation for why collaborations of the form considered here are evolutionarily stable. A more detailed discussion of these issues, covering a number of extensions of the basic case considered here together with various analytical results, which we will simply state, will be given elsewhere.
THE COLLABORATOR'S DILEMMA
We now give a precise formulation, in terms of evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith 1982) , of the division problem that arises in collaborations of the type considered above. The amount of the resource obtained by a successful collaboration which is in excess of the sum of the resources that could be obtained by each animal independently is denoted by R. Without any loss of generality we can always take R 1. We consider a population of N individuals labelled by i 1; 2, : : :, N. In addition we assume that there exists in the population a dominance hierarchy of height n: that is, every member of the population has a dominance rank associated to it, which is speci¢ed by an integer 1; 2, : : :, n. More formally, if we let D f1; 2, : : :, ng then the dominance rank of an individual i P is d(i) P D. An individual i is said to be dominant over an individual j if and only if d(i)5d( j). To formulate the division problem in terms of evolutionary game theory we associate to each member of the population i P a strategy i ( p i , q i ) P 0, 1 Â0, 1, de¢ned as follows: if in any pairwise interaction between i and another member of the population j, where i and j have di¡erent dominance ranks and d(i)5d( j) then p i P 0, 1 is the fraction of the excess resource R 1 that i o¡ers to j; if, however, d(i) > d( j) then q i P 0, 1 is the smallest o¡er that i will accept. To complete the speci¢cation of the game we must give the pay-o¡ that results from an interaction between i and j. The pay-o¡ is de¢ned as follows: if d(i)5d( j), say, then the pay-o¡ obtained by i against j is E(i, j) B(1 À p i ) if p i 5q j and E(i, j) 0 if p i 5q j , and the pay-o¡ obtained by j against i is E( j, i) B( p i ) if p i 5q j and E( j, i) 0 if p i 5q j . In these formulae for the pay-o¡, B is a ¢tness function which expresses the increase in ¢tness that an individual obtains from a given share of the excess resource. We shall assume here that B(0) 0 and that B(x) is a strictly increasing function of x. A particularly simple form of the game results from the choice B(x) x. However, we shall also consider here the case in which B is a concave function, re£ecting the fact that the bene¢t obtained from a resource will often obey a law of diminishing returns.
In the de¢nition of this game we assumed that individuals of the same dominance rank do not play against one another. This seems a reasonable assumption in view of the fact that such individuals do not possess any asymmetry which would allow either of them to impose a division of the resource on the other. We will make this assumption throughout this paper, although we note here the following two interesting alternative possibilities. The ¢rst is that individuals of equal dominance rank agree to a fair splitting of the excess resource instead of not playing at all. The second possibility is that if individuals with the same dominance rank form collaborations then they may attempt to divide the resource by engaging in a sequence of alternating o¡ers for how much the other will receive, with the sequence terminating when an o¡er is accepted. If it is also assumed that the value of the resource decreases with time then it follows from bargaining theory (Rubenstein 1986 ) that a division close to the fair one will evolve. The game de¢ned above, which we will call the Level n Ultimatum Game, gives a precise evolutionary game theory formulation of the type of division problem considered earlier. In the case n 2 and B(x) x this game reduces to the Classical Ultimatum Game (see Gu« th et al. (1982) ; Thaler (1988) ; Binmore (1992 Binmore ( , 1994 Binmore ( , 1998 ; Binmore et al. (1995) ; Samuelson (1997) ; and also Nowak et al. (2000) ; Page et al. (2000) ). However, in general, the Level n Ultimatum Game is more complex than the Classical Ultimatum Game as it allows a given individual to both propose divisions of the resource to those individuals in the population over which it is dominant and to respond to divisions o¡ered by individuals who are dominant over it.
We can deduce from the Level n Ultimatum Game the evolutionary outcome of the division problem. The basic argument can be described intuitively in the following way: consider, for simplicity, a situation (closely related to the Classical Ultimatum Game) in which the population is composed of two subpopulations 1 and 2 , where all the members of 1 have dominance rank l 1 and all the members of 2 have dominance rank l 2 . We shall assume that l 1 5l 2 . Furthermore, let us assume that the populations 1 and 2 are homogeneous in the sense that all members of 1 use the same strategy ( p 1 , q 1 ) and all members of 2 use the same strategy ( p 2 , q 2 ). In interactions between 1 and 2 , individuals in 1 only use strategy p 1 and individuals in 2 only use q 2 . Hence, we shall refer to p 1 and q 2 simply as p and q, respectively. If p4q then any mutant strategy p H in 1 which satis¢es p4p H 4q will receive a higher pay-o¡ than p and will invade. This process will continue until the 1 population consists of individuals with p q. A mutant q H in 2 with q H 5q will be neutral and such mutations can invade 2 by drift. Invasion by such q-lowering mutants results in a decrease in the mean q-level of 2 , which can in turn be exploited by p-lowering mutants in the 1 population. The continuation of this process results in the mean p and q values of 1 and 2 , respectively, evolving to zero. It is not hard to generalize this argument to the case of more than two homogeneous subpopulations with individuals in di¡erent subpopulations having di¡erent dominance ranks, to show that the o¡er and acceptance levels of all individuals evolve to zero.
Under the assumption that 1 and 2 are homogeneous the standard framework of adaptive dynamics (Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1990 , 1998 Nowak & Sigmund, 1990; Metz et al., 1996; Geritz et al. 1997 Geritz et al. , 1998 ) can be applied, giving the time evolution of p and q to be p ÀB H (1 À p) if p5q or p 0 if p5q, and q 0 (see also Nowak et al. (2000) ; Page et al. (2000) ). Thus for p4q, p will decrease until p reaches the line p q and for p5q the system will not change. According to the de¢ni-tion of the game used here the behaviour on the diagonal p q cannot be described by adaptive dynamics. The inability to describe the behaviour on the diagonal is due to the discontinuous nature of the step function used in the de¢nition of the game. However, if the game is modi¢ed by replacing the step function by an arbitrarily good smooth approximation, which is a reasonable change in view of the fact that in the real world changes cannot occur instantaneously, then it may be shown using adaptive dynamics that both p and q evolve to zero (for an alternative argument establishing this result see ). This adaptive dynamics argument can be extended to more than two homogeneous subpopulations, with individuals in di¡erent subpopulations having di¡erent dominance ranks, to show formally that for any ¢tness function B the o¡er and acceptance levels evolve to zero.
The result that the o¡er and acceptance level evolve to zero is con¢rmed by evolutionary simulations for heterogeneous populations with interactions between individuals with di¡erent strategies and dominance ranks. Figure 1 shows the results of evolutionary simulations for a population with n 2 and a linear ¢tness function. The same qualitative behaviour is obtained for hierarchies of any height and for any ¢tness functionöin all cases the o¡er and acceptance levels of the individuals in the population evolve to zero.
SPATIAL ULTIMATUM GAMES
We have seen above that the Collaborator's Dilemma is paradoxical in a sense that is reminiscent of the Prisoner's Dilemma. In view of the success in resolving many of the problems associated with the evolution of cooperation that results from the introduction of spatial structure (Nowak & May 1992; Nowak et al. 1994; Killingback et al. 1999) , it is natural to consider the e¡ect of spatial structure on the division problem de¢ned in ½ 2 (the e¡ect of spatial structure on the Classical Ultimatum Game has been discussed very recently by Page et al. (2000) ).
To de¢ne the spatial version of the Level n Ultimatum Game introduced in ½ 2 according to the principles of spatial evolutionary game theory (Killingback & Doebeli 1996) we introduce a two-dimensional lattice Ã, which could be, for example, a square lattice, a hexagonal lattice or even a random lattice given by an arbitrary tesselation of the plane. For a given lattice Ã we de¢ne a set of neighbours for each cell in Ã. For example, if Ã is a square lattice the neighbours of any given cell can be taken to be the eight cells immediately surrounding it; if Ã is a hexagonal lattice then the neighbours of a cell can be taken to be the six cells immediately surrounding it; in the case of a random lattice each cell can have a di¡erent number of neighbours, given by the cells which immediately surround the cell. Here we will take Ã to be a hexagonal lattice, although all our results are qualitatively unchanged on any other two-dimensional lattice. The case in which Ã is a random lattice de¢ned by the Voronoi diagram (see de Berg et al. (1997) ) of a set of points in the plane will be discussed in detail elsewhere. We assume that each cell is occupied by an individual which has associated to it both a dominance rank l P D and a strategy ( p, q) P , as in the non-spatial game. At the start of a given generation an individual in cell I P Ã plays against each of the individuals in its neighbouring cells, where the game between each pair of individuals is as de¢ned above. The ¢tness of an individual in a given cell is taken to be the sum of the pay-o¡s it receives from playing against its neighbours. Repeating this procedure for each cell results in all individuals on the lattice being assigned a ¢tness. At the start of the next generation the occupant of cell I is replaced by the occupant of the neighbouring cells of I and I itself which has the highest ¢tness (in case of a tie one of the ¢ttest individuals is chosen at random). Applying this procedure to every cell of the lattice results in the entire spatial lattice being updated each generation. We shall refer to the spatial game de¢ned in this way as the Level n Spatial Ultimatum Game .
To follow the evolutionary dynamics of this spatial game we start from an initial con¢guration consisting of Spatial Ultimatum Games T. Killingback and E. Studer ) x, as a function of time. The dynamics are determined using an evolutionary simulation in which the individuals in a population of 1000 have either dominance rank 1 or 2 and strategies ( p i , q i ). Each individual plays against all other individuals in the population that have a di¡erent dominance rank and receive pay-o¡s from the games as described in the text. The ¢tness of each individual in a given generation is taken to be the sum of the pay-o¡s it obtains in these games. Each individual then reproduces in proportion to its total ¢tness to yield the distribution of individuals in the next generation. We note that when an individual reproduces its o¡spring are assumed to inherit both its strategy ( p i , q i ) and its dominance rank. The mechanism which results in o¡spring having the same dominance rank as that of their parents could, in principle, involve either genetics, with o¡spring inheriting the attributes which were responsible for their parents' position in the dominance hierarchy, or imitation, with o¡spring copying the behaviour which was responsible for the parents' dominance rank. Mutations in the strategies ( p i , q i ) (which are chosen from a normal distribution with mean equal to the strategy mutating and variance equal to 10% of the mean) are introduced at a rate of 1% per generation. We see here that the mean values of p and q evolve to zero as discussed in the text. The same result is true for any number of dominance ranks and any ¢tness function B(x).
individuals whose dominance levels are picked uniformly randomly from D and whose strategies are picked randomly from . The evolutionary dynamics of the system follow from the updating rule de¢ned for the spatial game together with the occasional appearance of mutations in the strategies associated to the individuals on the lattice. We show in ¢gure 2 the evolutionary dynamics of the Level n Spatial Ultimatum Game for n 2, 3 and the linear ¢tness function B(x) x. The introduction of spatial structure clearly results in a striking di¡erence in the evolutionary outcome of the Ultimatum Game, with the mean of the strategies used by the population being reasonably close to a fair division, and with these fair strategies being maintained inde¢nitely.
For n 2 we can deduce analytically, by an extension of the methods used by Killingback et al. (1999) and Hauert (2001) to study the behaviour of spatial games, that an estimate of the asymptotic value of the mean o¡er made by the dominant individuals in the population is p 1/3. We see from ¢gure 2a that this estimate is in extremely good agreement with the results of our evolutionary simulations. We can also show that the Level n Spatial Ultimatum Game de¢ned on a lattice with a local neighbourhood that consists of m cells maintains individuals at all dominance ranks if and only if n 4 m/2. If this condition is initially not satis¢ed then subpopulations of individuals with a given dominance rank successively go extinct until the inequality is satis¢ed, at which point all dominance ranks are maintained inde¢nitely. This inequality is con¢rmed by our simulations. We ¢nd on the hexagonal lattice (i.e. m 6) that for n 2, 3 individuals of all dominance ranks are maintained inde¢nitely in the Level n Spatial Ultimatum Game. However, for n > 3 all individuals with certain dominance ranks are eliminated until only three dominance ranks remain in the population.
Qualitatively very similar results are obtained for nonlinear ¢tness functions B(x). Figure 3 shows the evolutionary dynamics of the Level 2 Spatial Ultimatum Game for B(x) 1 À e
À4x
. While the qualitative behaviour is identical to the linear case there is the obvious quantitative di¡erence that the asymptotic mean value of the o¡ers made by the dominant individuals in the population ( p 9 0:16) is now signi¢cantly lower than in the linear case. The qualitative behaviour of the Level n Spatial Ultimatum Game for n > 2 for nonlinear B(x) is the same as in the linear case. In particular, the condition that individuals at all dominance ranks are maintained if and only if n 4 m/2 still holds.
CONCLUSIONS
The formation of collaborations which enable a resource to be obtained more e¤ciently than by a solitary individual, are a common feature of animal behaviour. Here we have shown that certain types of collaborationsönamely those in which one individual is in a position to determine how the excess resource resulting from a successful collaboration will be divided, while the 1800 T. Killingback with ¢xed boundary conditions. (a) The evolution of the mean phenotypes for the Level 2 Spatial Ultimatum Game. The asymptotic value of the mean o¡er p is seen to be very close to the theoretical prediction p 1/3 and this value is maintained inde¢nitely. (b) The evolutionary dynamics of the Level 3 Spatial Ultimatum Game. The mean phenotypes now display greater variations than in the Level 2 case; however, all phenotypes are again maintained at signi¢cant levels. In this ¢gure, p 1 and p 2 are the o¡ers made by individuals of dominance ranks 1 and 2, respectively, and q 2 and q 3 are the acceptance levels of individuals of dominance ranks 2 and 3, respectively. In both cases the initial strategies in each cell were picked uniformly randomly from (0, 0.5) and mutations (which had the same characteristics as in the non-spatial case) occurred at a rate of 1% per generation. In addition, we include a stochastic element in the updating procedure so that in 5% of cases an individual is not taken over by the ¢ttest individual in its neighbourhood, but instead remains unchanged. À4x . Again all phenotypes are maintained inde¢nitely at non-zero levels; however, the value of p 9 0:16 is lower than in the linear case. All parameter values are as in ¢gure 2. other can only accept or reject the proposed collaborationösu¡er from a fundamental evolutionary instability. This instability, which is closely related to the behaviour of the Classical Ultimatum Game, follows from the fact that natural selection will favour the outcome in which an individual in the dominant role will always o¡er a zero share of the excess resource to the animal in the subdominant role, and an individual in the subdominant role will accept any share that is o¡ered. Because this results in the subdominant individual being no better o¡ than if it acted alone, no collaboration of this type will be stable. This breakdown in collaboration results in all individuals in the population being worse o¡ than they would have been had individuals, when dominant, made a non-zero o¡er.
We have shown here that the introduction of spatial structure radically changes the situation. In a spatially structured population selection leads to individuals both o¡ering and aspiring to non-zero divisions of the excess resource. Thus spatial structure yields a natural resolution of the Collaborator's Dilemma and provides a fundamentally simple explanation for the evolutionary stability of collaborative actions.
